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This paper proposes to revisit the debate on the theory of the firm using motivation theory as 
the primary analytical tool. Through the lens of motivation theory, the governance-based 
perspective emphasizes the role of extrinsic motivation (primarily in the form of incentives 
and governance structures) in counteracting opportunism and contractual hazards.  In turn, 
the competence-based approach (implicitly) builds on the role of identity-based normative 
intrinsic motivation seeing the firm as a social community in which members are willing to 
share knowledge in compliance to embedded norms and values. Based on our framework of 
different motivational mechanisms at work in an organizational context and a consideration 
of the interaction effects between them, one can reconcile much of the controversy between 
the two approaches. The application of motivation theory further enables us to expand the 
theory to aspects the current approaches do not yet cover. The consideration of enjoyment-
based hedonic intrinsic motivation allows us to highlight the role of firms as devices through 
which individuals can satisfy fundamental learning and self-enhancement needs. Finally, 
motivation-theory offers complementary explanations for inquiries related to the sources of 
firm heterogeneity and the determinants of firm boundaries.  
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  The question “What do firms do?” is fundamental to the definition and development 
of the field of management. Not surprisingly, significant efforts have been made over the last 
few decades to address it.  Two approaches to the theory of the firm, broadly defined by 
Williamson (1999) as "governance-based" and “competence-based”, have emerged.  The 
former incorporates contributions from transaction cost theory (Coase 1937; Williamson 
1975; Williamson 1979; Williamson 1981; Riordan and Williamson 1985; Williamson 1989), 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and contract theory (Grossman and Hart 1986).  
In contrast, the competence-based approach evolved from the debate regarding the sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage that dominates the field of strategic management.  A series 
of contributions, for instance by Kogut and Zander 1992), Conner & Prahalad (1996) and 
Grant (1996), culminated in Kogut and Zander’s (1996) definition of the firm as entities of 
“coordination, learning and identity.” 
Ultimately, the objective of firms is to direct human behavior towards the 
accomplishment of collective goals. Coordination, learning and identity are without a doubt 
important components of “what firms do” and are crucial to the achievement of their goals. 
However, these elements cannot substantiate by themselves collective activity unless the 
corresponding motivational drivers of organizational action are in place. Hence motivating 
individuals appears to play a substantial role in what firms do. Surprisingly, however, we find 
little to no explicit consideration of motivational issues in the existing approaches to the 
theory of the firm. It may therefore be a fruitful endeavor to revisit the received theory of the 
firm to inquire on the role motivation plays in what firms do, including its role as an enabler 
of coordination, identification and learning processes.  
From a motivation theory standpoint, a firm can be conceptualized as a device to 
develop and direct individuals’ motivation to act towards the achievement of collective goals. 
In this paper, we leverage the substantial body of work on motivation theory to (a) reconsider 
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existing approaches can be reconciled based on a taxonomy of different motivational 
mechanisms, and (c) expand the debate to novel answers to “what firms do” type of questions 
through the consideration of hitherto unexplored drivers of motivation. 
The theory of the firm debate has been marked by a substantial degree of controversy, 
(see for example, Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Williamson 1996, 1999; Moran and Ghoshal 
1996; Kogut and Zander 1996), and the perception that the two alternative approaches are 
incompatible in terms of their assumptions, reasoning and conclusions have limited the 
progress in this area. Recently it has been suggested that the integration of the two 
approaches into a general theory of the firm could offer additional insights (e.g. Foss 1999; 
Foss, Mahnke et al. 2000). In this paper, we argue that motivation theory does in fact offer an 
opportunity to link and potentially integrate the two approaches.  
 To this end, we argue that the governance-based approach is based on motivational 
mechanisms of one particular type. With its emphasis on questions of incentives and 
governance structures, this approach builds on reward-based extrinsic motivation to suppress 
opportunistic behavior. The competence-based approach relies on a very different type of 
motivation. Viewing the firm as a social community in which members are willing to share 
knowledge in compliance to embedded norms and values it (implicitly) focuses on the role of 
identity-based normative intrinsic motivation to make knowledge sharing and knowledge 
generation possible (Lindenberg 2001). Revisiting both theories based on a comprehensive 
model of motivational mechanisms in a firm reconciles many of the difference between the 
two approaches and shows that they are complementary not only with respect to their 
predictions, but also with respect to the fundamental behavioral mechanisms on which they 
are premised. 
Finally, this paper attempts to broaden the discourse on “what firms do” by focusing 
on one additional motivational mechanism that is as such not considered in governance or 
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motivation, hedonic intrinsic motivation (Lindenberg 2001), driven by the individual desire 
to be engaged in pleasant, self-determined and enriching activities. As firms determine 
several important aspects of individual job characteristics, they have a direct influence on 
hedonic intrinsic motivation.  
What are the implications of this observation for the theory of the firm? It points to 
the fact that firms serve a dual purpose. They not only direct the individuals’ motivation to 
act towards collective goals, but in doing so they can contribute to the individuals’ personal 
development towards increasing levels of self-actualization. This argument can actually be 
extended to the other motivational processes. Individuals are motivated by their desire to 
obtain additional resources (extrinsic motivation), adhere to and comply with the norms of a 
social community (NIM) and engage in activities that are pleasant, self-determined and 
enriching (HIM). Firms are inherently endowed with a context that enables them to respond 
to individual’s preferences of different types and thereby can trigger motivational processes, 
which in turn direct individual action towards collective goals.   This adds a potentially 
important dimension to the received conceptualization of the firm.  
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MOTIVATION AND THE DETERMINANTS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
 
The first step in the analysis is to provide a parsimonious model of the way different types of 
motivation influences individual behavior in an organizational context.  This will be required 
background knowledge to then analyze the different approaches to the theory of the firm from 
a motivation theory standpoint. 
 
A Taxonomy of Motivations and Motivators 
The concept of “motivation” plays a central role in research concerned with understanding 
the determinants of individual behavior in organizations and its impact on organizational 
performance (Deci 1971; Deci 1975; Deci and Ryan 1985; Lepper and Greene 1975; Frey 
1992; Frey 1993).  The basic argument is fairly simple: motivation can be linked to a set of 
underlying goals, from whose accomplishment individuals derive a certain level of utility 
(Deci 1976).  This then creates a motivation to engage in behavior that is perceived by 
individuals to be useful for meeting their goals.  The motivation to behave in a certain way is 
determined by: (1) the “motivator”, which determines the way, and the extent to which, the 
behavior contributes to the accomplishment of individual goals; and (2) individual 
preferences, i.e., the relevance of different goals, which determine the sensitivity of the 
individual to different motivators.  
Whereas a number of classifications of motivational mechanisms with varying 
degrees of granularity have been proposed in the literature (e.g. Deci 1971; Deci 1975; Deci 
and Ryan 1985), our analysis is founded upon a three-category taxonomy. The taxonomy 
extends Deci’s (1975) initial dichotomy of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation following a 
refinement proposed by Lindenberg 2001), which separates intrinsic motivation into a task-
related component,    the enjoyment-based “hedonic intrinsic motivation”    and a social 
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category taxonomy captures the fundamental differences between the mechanisms through 
which organizations can influence motivation. At the same time it remains parsimonious and 
hence better suited for application to organizational-level analysis, for which some of the 
more fine-grained taxonomies used in social psychology become quickly excessively 
complex.  
Extrinsic motivation is driven by the goal of obtaining additional resources from the 
external environment (Brief and Aldag 1977; Lindenberg 2001).  These resources can be 
tangible or intangible and can take the form of money, power, recognition etc.  The impact of 
extrinsic motivation depends jointly on the extrinsic motivator, i.e. the resources that the 
individual obtains as a function of any given behavior, and on the importance of these 
resources to the individual. 
Normative intrinsic motivation is driven by the goal of engaging in behavior that is 
compliant with norms and values.  Individuals are thus normatively intrinsically motivated to 
engage in, or refrain from, a given behavior, depending on whether this behavior is congruent 
with the norms and values of the social community they identify with (Allen and Meyer 
1990; Kreps 1997).  The key point is that the motivator here is not related to any reaction of 
the outside community to their behavior but the satisfaction that they perceive from the sheer 
identification and integration with the community they feel they belong to. The intensity of 
normative intrinsic motivation further depends on the degree to which individuals care about 
norm-compliance. 
Hedonic intrinsic motivation is driven by the goal of being engaged in behavior with 
desirable characteristics.  What motivates individuals to execute a given task, then, are the 
desirable intrinsic characteristics of the task (Deci and Ryan 1985; Lindenberg 2001), namely 
(a) the inherent joy individuals might derive directly from the execution of the task, (b) the 
freedom of action eventually present in deciding ways and means related to its execution 
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of the task (competence-enhancing)
1. Intrinsic hedonic motivation varies with the degree to 
which individuals perceive the characteristics of their task and the task context positively or 
negatively with respect to their own system of values or idiosyncratic tastes (Brief and Aldag 
1975; Hackman, Oldham et al. 1975; Hackman and Oldham 1976; Hackman and Gersick 
1990).  The impact of hedonic intrinsic motivation depends also on the importance the 
individual attributes to being engaged in enjoyable, self-determined and competence-
enhancing behavior (King, Hautaluoma et al. 1983).  
Table 1 offers a brief summary of the elements of this taxonomy of motivational 
antecedents to human behavior. 
  
----(Table 1 about here)---- 
 
An important point to consider is that different social science traditions interested in 
explaining behavior, and the underlying characteristics of individual motivation, have 
focused on different components of the taxonomy presented above.  For example, economics 
has historically focused on extrinsic motivation, studying the influence of incentive systems, 
monitoring and control mechanisms without explicitly considering the influence of intrinsic 
motivation and its possible antecedents in their models (Frey and Jegen 2001; Baker, Gibbons 
et al. 1994).  Organizational behavior and social psychology, on the other hand, emphasize 
the role of intrinsic types of motivation and consider rewards and extrinsic motivation as 
either counterproductive (“over-justification effect”, Lepper and Greene 1978) or irrelevant 
(e.g. Deci 1976; Amabile and Hill 1994; Deci and Koestner 1999; Deci and Koestner 1999).   
The debate between these different views has not been resolved, although recent work 
                                                 
1 Note that personal development here is meant not only in terms of learning new skills, but also learning about 
novel contexts, about one’s own strengths and weaknesses, and eventually about enhancing the positive and 
reducing the negative aspects of one’s cognitive, emotional and moral self. 
  8has aimed at a more comprehensive treatment of the topic, attempting to consider both 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors as well as their interaction effects (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee 1997; Frey and Jegen 2001; Amabile 1993). It is not the objective of this paper to 
contribute to this debate per se, but rather to leverage the existing knowledge about 
motivation as a complex and multifaceted construct to better understand the role it plays in 
different conceptions of the firm and then eventually even on the market as additional 
institutional context for the conduct of economic activity.  
  One aspect of particular importance to our argument that remains often implicit in the 
discussion of motivation is the crucial role of individual preferences as an important 
contingency of motivational mechanisms. People differ not only in their personal goals and 
values, but also: (a) in what type of resources (financial compensation, power, recognition, 
etc.) stimulate their behavior most effectively, i.e. how sensitive they are to additional 
availability of resources; (b) in sensitivity to the different characteristics of their task, for 
instance, the variety in its skill requirements, its relevance, the level of autonomy, the 
knowledge of its results, its personal growth potential (Hackman et al, 1975) and to the 
importance they attach to having a job tailored to their preferences and attitudes; and, (c) in 
the extent and ease to which they will internalize social norms and values, as well as the 
importance they place on feeling fully integrated into the social community in which they 
work. To illustrate the importance of this effect, we model motivation as determined by three 
distinct groups of motivators that influence the three dimensions of motivation in a strength 
and to a degree that depends on individual motivational preferences (Figure 1).  
 
 
----(Figure 1 about here)---- 
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The overall willingness to behave in a given way thus depends on the joint impact of 
extrinsic, normative intrinsic and hedonic intrinsic motivation.  It is important to note that 
these three types of motivation are not orthogonal in their impact on interest alignment, but 
that important interaction effects exist between them. The nature of these interaction terms 
has been subject to substantial debate in social psychology (e.g. Deci 1975; Deci 1976; Deci 
and Koestner 1999; Lepper and Greene 1978; King, Hautaluoma et al. 1983; Amabile 1993) 
and economics alike (e.g. Baker, Gibbons et al. 1994; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Frey 
and Jegen 2001; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994; Gal-Or and Amit 1998).  
  For the purpose of this paper, we simply note that extrinsic, normative intrinsic and 
hedonic intrinsic motivation are interrelated mechanisms (Kerr and Jackofsky 1989) that need 
to be considered simultaneously, both in their independent and joint effects.  At the same 
time it is important to observe that, depending on the specific task requirements, different 
types of motivation can serve as complementary or alternative ways of stimulating the 
desired behavior.  One can imagine a situation in which the same behavior, e.g. working 
overtime, can be a result of either one of three motivational mechanisms: (a) extrinsic 
motivation to work overtime may stem from higher overtime pay; (b) hedonic intrinsic 
motivation to work overtime may be due to a direct utility from continued engagement in a 
pleasant activity; or, (c) normative intrinsic motivation to work overtime may be the 
consequence of social norms that consider occasional (unpaid) overtime an aspect of “good 
organizational citizenship”.  In this case, hedonic intrinsic, normative intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation are alternative possibilities to stimulate the same behavior.  
On the other hand, there may be types of behavior that can be stimulated by one of 
these factors but not the others.  For example, the literature on reward systems has pointed to 
the fact that free-riding problems make it difficult to achieve cooperative behavior in a 
teamwork setting in which individual contributions to team performance remain unobserved 
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that favor such cooperative behavior, normative intrinsic motivation can be a successful way 
of increasing team performance.  In such a situation, different types of motivation can be 
complementary mechanisms to motivate desired behavior. Similarly, certain activities simply 
seem to require a certain type of motivation, as illustrated by Amabile’s work (Amabile 
1997), on creativity-based tasks that can only be effectively stimulated through intrinsic types 
of motivation.  
  Armed with this parsimonious, but sufficiently detailed, model of how motivation 
influences human behavior in organizations, we can now turn our attention to the core aspects 
of this work, the link between motivation and the theory of the firm. 
 
 
MOTIVATION IN THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
 
In the following, we are going to take a look at both governance-based and competence-
based approaches to the theory of the firm from a motivation-based perspective. The 
application of the previously developed model of motivation types enables us to (a) identify 
similarities in the underlying logic of both approaches, (b) illustrate differences in the 
motivational mechanisms that either approach (implicitly) focuses on and (c) reconcile some 
of the inconsistencies between the two theories as due to differences in the underlying 
assumptions regarding motivational preferences of individuals and motivational requirements 
of tasks. 
 
Contrasting Governance-Based and Competence-Based Arguments 
If we compare the governance-based and competence-based perspectives at a sufficiently 
high level of abstraction, we can see that both follow quite a similar logic: As alternative 
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situations in which firms are “better at doing something” than markets. The governance-based 
perspective emphasizes the advantage of firms to organize transactions more efficiently 
(under specific circumstances) than markets (Williamson 1975; Williamson 1985; 
Williamson 1999}. The competence-based perspective concentrates on the role of firms to 
deal with (or generate) knowledge in a way that markets cannot, or at least cannot effectively 
do (Kogut & Zander, 1996). The seemingly trivial but important insight here is that we can 
consequently say that governance-based and competence-based perspectives both identify 
specific types of activities, which can be performed under specific circumstances more 
effectively within the firm than through markets.  
The question then becomes: how are firms able to achieve this advantage? The 
governance-based perspective argues that the employment contract allocates property rights 
and provides the basis for incentives to motivate desired behavior in a way that is not possible 
through market transactions. The competence-based perspective, on the other hand, argues 
that firms are social communities with shared norms, values and terminology and provide 
identity to their members (Kogut and Zander 1996; Foss 1999), which makes knowledge 
generation and transfer possible (Zander and Kogut 1995; Kogut and Zander 1996). At a 
more abstract level, both perspectives highlight mechanisms through which firms can 
influence human behavior in a way that enables firms to perform their respective focal type 
of activity more effectively than markets. However, both perspectives differ fundamentally 




A Motivation-Based Look at Existing Theories of the Firm  
We can now utilize the previously developed model of determinants of motivation to restate 
  12the fundamental tenants of both governance-based and competence-based approaches in 
motivational terms: Governance-based theories of the firm emphasize the superiority of the 
firm to perform specific types of transactions based on its ability to incentivize, monitor and 
control human behavior. From a motivational theory perspective, this ability is related to the 
efficient use of extrinsic motivational mechanisms.  Governance-based theories of the firm 
specify in fact the conditions
2 under which arms-length contracts fail to (extrinsically) 
motivate individuals to refrain from undesirable behavior characterized as adverse selection 
or moral hazard. Within the firm, another type of contractual arrangement (the hierarchical 
employment relationship) and additional possibilities to monitor and control individual 
behavior are available. Hence, in the firm individuals can be (extrinsically) motivated to 
efficiently perform such transactions.  
Competence-based theories of the firm on the other hand highlight the superior ability 
of firms to generate and transfer knowledge.  Proponents from this school of thought argue 
that incentive contracts, monitoring and control are not efficient means to stimulate 
knowledge transfer and generation. A shared identity and common norms and values are 
required to accomplish this (Kogut and Zander 1996).  In motivation terms, this implies that 
the generation and transfer of knowledge has very specific motivational requirements. Both 
can only be effectively stimulated through motivational processes that draw on shared norms 
and values, in other words through normative intrinsic motivation. As these authors  
implicitly assume firms to provide a high level of shared values and identity they are better 
able to perform knowledge generation and transfer processes based on this type of 
motivation.  
 
The Role of Individual Motivational Preferences 
The first step toward the reconciliation of the two theoretical perspectives requires us to 
                                                 
2 Asset specificity, uncertainty and potentially opportunistic actors. 
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based perspective is based on the assumption of (at least potentially) opportunistic human 
actors. The competence-based perspective on the contrary focuses on the human desire to 
belong to and identify with a social community. Our model of motivation (Figure 1) points to 
the important moderating effect that individual preferences have on motivation processes. 
The relative force of extrinsic and intrinsic types of motivation depends on the sensitivity of 
individuals to various types of motivators. This component of our model is the key to a better 
understanding of the origins of many of the differences and inconsistencies between 
governance-based and competence-based arguments. The preoccupation of the two 
approaches with different motivational mechanisms follows, according to our model, directly 
from the different assumptions regarding human nature they make.  
Opportunism can be understood as a case of a particularly high level of sensitivity to 
extrinsic motivation. In such a case, the individual cares so much about additional rewards 
that this desire has a dominant influence on behavior and other aspects, such as fairness, 
collaboration, compliance with norms and values and rules, are not taken into consideration. 
Hence, the individual is ready to act opportunistically to obtain additional resources. The fact 
that governance-based approaches assume individuals to be (potentially) opportunistic, thus 
explains the preoccupation of this approach with questions of extrinsic motivation.  
The competence-based perspective, on the other hand, is not based on the assumption 
of opportunistic individuals. Instead it emphasizes the human desire to be part of a social 
community and to comply with organizational norms and values. This implies that 
individuals are more receptive to normative intrinsic motivation. It is thus not surprising that 
this perspective highlights the firm's advantage in processes related to the generation of 
transfer of knowledge which are facilitated by the presence of high levels of individual-
organization identification and thus normative intrinsic motivation. 
In this context, it is important to emphasize once again that in reality, individuals are 
  14both potentially opportunistic and striving to adhere to a social community, albeit at different 
degrees. Hence they vary with respect to their sensitivity to the various types of motivation. 
Furthermore, the multitude of activities to be performed in organizations varies in the degree 
to which the corresponding behavior can be efficiently stimulated through extrinsic and 
(normative) intrinsic motivation. Consequently, a combination of governance-based and 
competence-based arguments needs to be considered if we want to understand how firms are 
able to motivate large groups of individuals to perform complex activities that involve 
numerous heterogeneous sub-tasks. Governance- and competence-based perspectives need 
thus to be considered as complementary not only with respect to their predictions, but also 
with respect to the fundamental behavioral mechanisms on which they are premised. 
Beyond this complementarity argument, however, it is also important to remind 
ourselves of the interrelated nature of different motivational mechanisms. As prior motivation 
research shows, there are important interaction effects between extrinsic and intrinsic types of 
motivation (e.g. Deci 1975; Deci 1976; Deci and Koestner 1999; Lepper and Greene 1978; 
King, Hautaluoma et al. 1983; Amabile 1993; Baker, Gibbons et al. 1994; Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Frey and Jegen 2001; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994; Gal-Or and 
Amit 1998)). In particular, the use of extrinsic rewards has been found to reduce intrinsic 
levels of motivation in many situations. This points to the need to consider both governance-
based and competence-based arguments jointly and simultaneously, as otherwise one would 
miss not only one part of the picture but also the interaction effect between the two elements.  
The relevance of the interrelated nature of governance- and competence-based 
arguments can be seen in critique of governance-based approaches articulated by Ghoshal 
and Moran (Ghoshal and Moran 1996). Based on the notion that the level of opportunism is 
not exogenously given but can be seen as a variable, these authors argue that a heavy use of 
incentives and control contributes to the development of opportunistic attitudes and reduces 
the willingness of individuals to cooperate and share knowledge. Based on our model of 
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argument. Incentive-based extrinsic motivation can crowd-out intrinsic motivation (Deci 
1976; Deci and Ryan 1985; Lepper and Greene 1978) and thereby reduces the sensitivity of 
individuals to social norms and values. This in turn reduces their willingness to share critical 
knowledge resources (Kogut and Zander 1996). Hence it is crucial to combine the descriptive 
power of governance- and competence-based perspectives and even more so to incorporate 
the nature of their interdependencies in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
what firms do.   
 
 
A MOTIVATION-BASED VIEW OF WHAT FIRMS DO 
 
Looking at governance-based and competence-based theories of the firm through a 
motivational lens, we have been able to make a number of important observations. First, we 
have seen that both perspectives follow the same underlying logic, in that each of them 
identifies one particular mechanism based on which firms facilitate the efficient performance 
of a specific type of activities. Second, we have seen that the mechanism that each 
perspective specifies can be attributed to one distinct type of motivation. Third, it has become 
obvious that this focus on one type of motivation follows directly from the assumption the 
respective school of thought makes regarding the motivational preferences of individual 
actors (see Table 2).  
  Motivation theory, however, provides not only a new and insightful perspective on 
existing approaches to the theory of the firm. It also points us to novel ways to think about 
the nature of the firm. In this section we propose twotypes of additional applications of 
motivation theory to further our understanding of what firms do. First, we build on a 
currently overlooked type of motivation; hedonic intrinsic motivation, to suggest a third and 
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explicitly the interdependencies between individual preferences and organizational goals to 
propose an integrated perspective on the two sides of the motivational coin: what firms do for 
the individual and what individuals do for the firm.   
  
Adding the Missing Piece: Hedonic Intrinsic Motivation 
One immediate question arises from the observation that existing governance-based and 
competence-based theories of the firm focus on extrinsic and normative intrinsic motivation 
respectively, while the third motivational mechanism, hedonic intrinsic motivation, is thus far 
not addressed. Consequently one wonders whether the consideration of this type of 
motivation can add something to the analysis. In order to answer this question, we propose to 
proceed in the following way. First, we need to agree that hedonic intrinsic motivation is 
actually present in the organizational context and that it has relevant implications for the 
degree to which firms are able to reach their objectives. Second, we need to convince 
ourselves that this type of motivation can offer a novel way to think about what firms 
fundamentally are about. 
  Regarding the first step, recall that hedonic intrinsic motivation is tied to the 
individual’s deriving a sense of purpose and enjoyment from being engaged in pleasant, 
autonomous and enriching activities (Deci and Ryan 1985; Lindenberg 2001). Prima face, it 
may not be intuitive that this type of motivation is present inside a business firm. In fact we 
are more used to seeing the achievement of joy and self-realization as a powerful motivator 
for non-work-related activities. However, there is an increasing amount of theoretical 
arguments, as well as empirical evidence, pointing to the existence and relevance of joy, self-
determination and personal growth in the work environment. Amabile and Hill, for example, 
document the existence of intrinsic motivational orientation at work (Amabile and Hill 1994). 
Related work by Amabile and colleagues points to the relevance of (hedonic) intrinsic 
  17motivation for a large range of tasks involving creativity (Amabile 1997). Finally Huy (Huy 
1999) shows that positive emotional dynamics are significant antecedents to the success of 
complex organizational change processes.  
  Further, it is important to consider that hedonic intrinsic motivation is not 
exogenously given.  Firms have a number of possibilities to actively influence the degree to 
which individual tasks are perceived as pleasant, autonomous and enriching. In fact, job 
design does not only have an influence on the efficiency of business processes, but also on 
whether the corresponding tasks stimulate hedonic intrinsic motivation. For instance, the 
performance effect of job-enrichment initiatives (Hackman, Oldham et al. 1975; Hackman 
and Oldham 1976; Hackman and Gersick 1990) can to a large extent be attributed to 
increased hedonic intrinsic motivation.  Firms that are able to provide a work environment 
that is perceived by employees as pleasant, autonomous and enriching, benefit from greater 
individual hedonic intrinsic motivation.  
  This, we suggest, may be the key to a novel way to think about the firm. According to 
this perspective, firms are social institutions responsible for the personal development and 
self-actualization of the individuals working in them.  They in fact provide a work 
environment that (potentially) allows individuals to satisfy fundamental hedonic needs, such 
as the desire for self-determined action, and personal growth (Deci 1971; Deci 1975; Deci 
and Ryan 1985).  
 
Closing the Loop: The Link Between Individual Needs and Organizational Goals 
Looking at firms from a motivation-based perspective points to a possible extension of the 
prevailing conceptualization of what firms do. In fact, the notion of firms as devices to 
develop and direct individuals’ motivation to act towards the achievement of collective goals 
one may only be one side of the coin. The other side consists of their role as vehicles through 
which individuals can satisfy their fundamental needs. This includes not only the satisfaction 
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the satisfaction of social needs, as firms provide a social community for their members 
(Kogut and Zander 1992; Kogut and Zander 1996).  Finally there is the possible satisfaction 
of hedonic needs, as firms provide the opportunity to tailor operating tasks in a way that 
meets the individual’s need for personal growth and development.  
  This makes it possible to move away from the paradigm in which the interests of the 
firm and the individual are competing and conflicting. Instead, it may be possible in theory 
that they interact more like one hand washing the other: firms potentially provide individuals 
with what they fundamentally care for and individuals in exchange contribute through their 
behavior to the accomplishment of organizational goals.   (see Figure 2) 
 




  19MOTIVATION-BASED EXTENSIONS TO THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
 
 
So far, we have focused our attention on the ability of motivation theory to enhance our 
understanding of what firms do – both by looking at the existing approaches from a 
motivation-based perspective and by adding additional elements to the picture. Now, we can 
shift our focus to other aspects of the theory of the firm and explore whether the explicit 
consideration of motivation theory also enables us to refine our understanding of the 
determinants of firm heterogeneity and boundaries.   
 
Motivation as a Driver of Firm Heterogeneity  
 
Explaining the reasons for firm heterogeneity, both in terms of why firms have different 
characteristics and why firms perform differently, is another element of the theory of the firm 
that appears in fresh light once seen from a motivation perspective.  Here again, the fact that 
in general individuals differ substantially in their motivational preferences plays a crucial 
role.  We therefore have to expect heterogeneity also in the aggregate motivational 
preferences of different firms. This then drives firm heterogeneity in other organizational 
attributes through the following mechanism.  
The overall level of aggregate motivation in an organization depends on the level of 
correspondence between the different motivators the organization can offer and the aggregate 
motivational preferences of the workforce. To effectively motivate their employees, each 
firm will thus make specific choices in their organizational design.  For example, a firm 
might try to maximize extrinsic motivation by tailoring reward systems to the specific 
preference of its workforce.  Similarly, it might adjust the task design in response to what the 
employees perceive as pleasant and enriching.  Finally it may use socialization initiatives 
(Van Maanen 1978; Van Maanen and Schein 1979; Kerr and Jackofsky 1989) to increase the 
salience of organizational norms and values through increased levels of employee-firm 
identification. Fig. 3 illustrates the different organizational mechanisms available to influence 
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individual preferences towards the motivational processes. 
Firms facing different motivational preference in their respective workforce will make 
different choices in the design of their organizational motivators. This illustrates how 
heterogeneity in aggregated motivational preference drives heterogeneity in other important 
organizational attributes and can be interpreted as a motivation-based reason for 
heterogeneity in firm characteristics.    
 
---------- Figure 3 --------------  
 
   Along the same lines, motivational mechanisms can also be a source of heterogeneity 
in performance across firms. In fact, firm performance is not only a question of a firm’s 
endowment with assets, capabilities and market positions, but also depends on the willingness 
of employees to deploy these resources (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Wright and Snell 1991; Wright, McMahan et al. 1994 ; 
Makadok 2003). In other words, the degree to which a firm motivates its employees to work 
towards organizational goals is a key determinant of performance. The aggregate motivation 
of a firm’s workforce is itself a function of the degree to which the chosen configuration of 
reward system, job design and socialization regime fits the aggregate motivational 
preferences.  
This then lets us distinguish between two motivation-based sources of heterogeneity 
in firm performance. First, there may be situations in which firms are similar in their 
configuration of reward system, job design and socialization regime, but different in the 
motivational preferences of their workforce. In such a case some firms will have a better fit 
between their reward system, job design and socialization regime on the one hand and the 
aggregate motivational preferences of their workforce on the other, which translates ceteris 
  21paribus into greater performance.  
Alternatively, one could imagine a case in which firms are (relatively) similar in terms 
of the motivational preferences of their workforce, but differ in the ability to tailor the 
configuration of reward system, job design and socialization regime to the motivational 
preferences of their workforce. Here again, heterogeneity in the level of correspondence  
between their reward system, job design and socialization regime on the one hand and the 
aggregate motivational preferences of their workforce on the other, drives performance 
differences and firms with a higher level of correspondence will ceteris paribus outperform 
their peers. 
In reality, one would expect to find a combination of both of these mechanisms at 
play, even though their relative salience may differ depending on the specific context. For the 
purpose of this paper it is important to recognize that the consideration of motivational 
factors helped us identify novel and complementary explanations for heterogeneity in firm 
performance.  
 
Motivation as a Determinant of Firm Boundaries 
 
We have seen that motivation theory can serve as an insightful perspective on questions of 
firm existence and firm heterogeneity, but what does it have to say with respect to the 
determinants of firm boundaries? Existing approaches to the theory of the firm have analyzed 
the determinants of firm scale as well as of firm scope. As we will show in this section, 
motivation theory can be used to shed new light on both of these questions. 
 
Motivation and Firm Scale. An important limitation to firm scale stems again from the fact 
that employees are heterogeneous with respect to their motivational preferences. To motivate 
a workforce with heterogeneous motivational preferences, the firm has to make differentiated 
use of rewards, job design choices and socialization. In theory it would be optimal to tailor 
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this is unrealistic for two reasons. First, there are considerable costs related to the tailoring of 
motivators at such a level of granularity. Second, we have to consider the effect that 
individuals have a preference for homogeneous treatment within their organization. As 
research on social comparison theory points out, (perceived) inequity in terms of how people 
are rewarded, how individual jobs are designed etc.  can lead to reduced effort and low 
morale (Adams 1963; Adams 1965; Homans 1961). It is commonly assumed (Zenger and 
Hesterly 1997) that firm boundaries circumscribe the domain of comparison for employees in 
this context.  
Consequently there seems to be a choice between two evils: either firms can tailor 
organizational motivators to individual preferences, which causes unpopular heterogeneity in 
the organizational motivators and can be a de-motivator by itself, or they keep organizational 
motivators homogeneous, at the cost of sub-optimal motivation levels.  No matter which 
position a firm chooses between full homogeneity or perfect tailoring, there will always be 
some level of inefficiency related to the heterogeneity in motivational preference of the 
workforce (see Table 3).  
  This inefficiency increases in firm size, as bringing in additional employees almost 
inevitably increase the absolute level of heterogeneity of motivational preferences in the 
workforce and it becomes increasingly difficult and costly to tailor organizational motivators 
to them (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). This mechanism constitutes a complementary 
explanation for the existence of diseconomies of scale. At the same time, it can be seen as 
another important reason for the choice of multi-unit structural arrangement, which may in 
fact be the result of a trade-off between questions of coordination (pushing for larger entities) 
and of motivation (pushing for smaller entities with less motivational heterogeneity). 
 
Motivation and Firm Scope.  A similar motivation-based reasoning also applies to questions 
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motivational requirements. In other words, the type of motivation that is best suited to 
stimulate employees to perform one task effectively may not be equally appropriate for 
another task.  Remember the case of processes underlying the generation and transfer of 
knowledge.  As Kogut and Zander (1996) explain, shared norms and values are necessary to 
perform such tasks, which corresponds to the requirement of normative intrinsic, rather than 
extrinsic forms of motivation. Similarly, tasks that involve high levels of creativity seem to 
be most effectively performed when hedonic intrinsic motivation is dominant (Amabile 
1997). Finally, it is obvious that some tasks can hardly be effectively motivated through 
anything but reward-based extrinsic motivation.  An often cited example is that of motivating 
employees at the conveyor belt for the extraction of inner organs of slaughtered animals in a 
food processing plant.   
It seems therefore as if the necessary level of heterogeneity of organizational 
motivators within a given firm depends not only on the motivational preferences of its 
workforce, but also on the heterogeneity in motivational requirements of the tasks to be 
performed. If a firm was to perform a wide range of activities, different with respect to the 
type of motivation they require, it will find itself forced to use very different organizational 
motivators for different parts of its workforce. This then contributes to the phenomenon of 
unpopular heterogeneity in organizational motivators described above (Adams 1963; Adams 
1965; Homans 1961), which might cause important inefficiencies (see Table 3).  
One example for the practical relevance of this phenomenon would be the difficulties 
to combine commercial banking and investment banking activities under the same 
organizational roof. The heterogeneity of motivational requirements of the different sub-tasks 
to be performed will in general increase in firm scope.  This mechanism thus joints other 
factors to explain diseconomies of scope.  
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Motivation Without the Firm 
So far we explored various facets of how a motivation-perspective helps us understand the 
nature of the firm, as well as the sources of firm heterogeneity and the determinants of firm 
scale and scope. But what happens in motivational terms if there is no firm? What are the 
motivational mechanisms at work if individuals act as individual agents on the market as 
atomistic firms, i.e. on their own, owning the assets required for their activity and being the 
residual claimants to the rents from their activity?  
In fact, even in this case, individuals are exposed to motivational mechanisms 
corresponding to the three dimensions of the previously introduces taxonomy. With respect to 
extrinsic motivation, one can note that if individuals participate in market-based exchange, 
there is no explicit reward system that pre-specifies the amount of resources an individual 
will obtain as a function of given behavior.  Nevertheless, markets can provide powerful 
extrinsic motivators through the profit that market participants obtain for their activity.  
Importantly, however, profits and rents that result from a given behavior depend not on a 
reward system, but on market characteristics, such as the intensity of rivalry, market shares, 
market concentration etc.  
In the case of normative intrinsic motivation, we find that market exchange can 
stimulate this type of motivation only if norms and values are present that influence market 
participants. One example for such a situation would be the set of behavioral norms that 
exists on the trading floors of large stock exchanges and influences the behavior of traders.  
In such cases, and to the extent that individuals identify themselves with the market, markets 
provide some form of normative intrinsic motivation as well.  
 Finally, hedonic intrinsic motivation is determined by the perceived characteristics of 
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substantially depending on whether the task is performed within a firm or in the market. 
Firms have some flexibility in the design of individual jobs and the work environment and 
can thus actively influence hedonic intrinsic motivation (Hackman, Oldham et al. 1975; 
Hackman and Oldham 1976; Hackman and Gersick 1990). The very nature of the market, 
however, also determines some aspects of task characteristics. For example, market 
conditions can range from “tough” or “cut-throat”, to more “comfortable“ and “cooperative”.  
In summary, one can observe that all the three types of motivation considered in this 
analysis are at work in the special case of market exchanges among atomistic organizations, 
just as they are in firms (see Table 4). Consequently the presence of firms is no necessary 
condition for either of the three types of motivation. The question of whether firms or market 
interactions among atomistic organizations provide the better motivators cannot be answered 
in general. Instead, the answer will depend on (a) the motivational preferences of the 
individual, (b) the motivational requirements of the task and (c) the motivational context of a 
given firm or a specific market.   
Each of the approaches to the theory of the firm discussed in this paper focuses on one 
specific set of conditions in which there is an advantage of firms vis-à-vis markets in 
motivational terms. The governance-based perspective highlights the advantage of firms is 
stimulating extrinsic motivation thanks to the employment contract even if actors are 
opportunistic. The competence-based perspective points to the advantage of firms in 
providing a shared identity to which individuals can adhere and which triggers the normative 
intrinsic motivation necessary for knowledge generation and sharing processes. Finally, the 
novel perspective based on hedonic intrinsic motivation also points to one reason why firms 
can have a motivational advantage over markets, as individual preferences may be such that 
the characteristics of individual tasks are perceived as more enjoyable, self-determined or 
competence-enhancing, so that hedonic intrinsic motivation is greater in the firm. 
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It is an established fact that motivation plays an important role as a determinant of individual 
behavior. Yet the dominant approaches to the theory of the firm do not explicitly 
acknowledge the role motivation plays also in this context. It has been the objective of this 
paper to take a close look at the motivational processes at play in an organizational setting 
and to apply motivation theory to a variety of questions related to our understanding of what 
firms do, why they differ and what determines their boundaries. 
Then, what have we learned during this journey through the complexities of 
motivational processes and the role they play in theories of the firm?  The fundamental point 
is that, if our analysis is correct, motivation theory shows a considerable potential to 
integrate, refine and expand the way we think about the firm. A first contribution of this 
paper lies in the reconceptualization of governance- and competence-based approaches as 
alternative explanations for firm existence that rely on distinct motivational processes. The 
governance-based view, with its emphasis on incentives, monitoring and control builds on 
reward-based extrinsic motivation to suppress potential opportunistic behavior, while the 
competence-based approach focuses on the role of identity-based normative intrinsic 
motivation to make knowledge sharing and generation possible.  
Furthermore, the application of motivation theory could help to overcome many of the 
incompatibilities of the two approaches and to show that they are complementary not only 
with respect to their predictions, but also with respect to the fundamental behavioral 
mechanisms on which they are premised. Once the underlying motivational mechanisms and 
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between opponents of the two perspectives appears in a different light. For example, much of 
the controversy between Ghoshal and Moran (1996) on the one side and Williamson (1996) 
and Foss (1996) on the other can be explained as related to the negative effect of extrinsic 
motivation on intrinsic forms of motivation that is extensively discussed both in social 
psychology (e.g. Deci 1975; Deci 1976; Deci and Koestner 1999; Lepper and Greene 1978; 
King, Hautaluoma et al. 1983; Amabile 1993) and economics (Baker, Gibbons et al. 1994; 
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Frey and Jegen 2001; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994; Gal-Or 
and Amit 1998).  
The explicit consideration of the different motivational mechanisms on which 
governance-based and competence-based approaches are grounded may constitute some 
natural common ground of the two explanations, indicating a theoretical link that might serve 
to appreciate each specific contribution together with their joint effects.  Hopefully this might 
go some way towards a response to the repeated calls for efforts to integrate the two bodies of 
theoretical work (Foss, 1999; Foss et al., 2000; Makadok, 2003).  
The second element of novelty in the theoretical perspective advanced lies in the 
application of the model of determinants of motivational processes in an organizational 
context to gain further insights into additional questions related to the theory of the firm. 
Driven by the belief that motivation theory may eventually serve as the basis for a 
comprehensive general theory of the firm that encompasses governance- and competence-
based approaches, we take a closer look at possible alternative conceptualizations of what 
firms do, as well as the determinants of firm heterogeneity and boundaries. 
  We first focus on the hedonic component of motivation and propose a view of firms 
as social institutions responsible for the personal development and self-actualization of the 
individuals working within their domain, allowing them to satisfy fundamental hedonic 
needs, such as the desire for self-determined action, and personal growth. This novel way to 
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approaches in that it focuses on the third, currently overlooked, type of motivation. It further 
suggests that individual choice between working in a firm or acting as an individual 
participant in market-based exchanges may be in part driven by individual preferences for the 
characteristics of tasks performed in either form of institutional arrangement.  One could even 
claim that firms receive their license to operate by public authorities not only because of their 
contribution to the economic wealth of communities in which they are involved, but also for 
the impact of their activities on the personal development of their employees. 
  In a second step we recognized the potentially reciprocal relationship between 
organizations and their members. On the one hand firms can be seen as devices to direct 
individuals’ motivation towards collective goals based on the organizational motivators in 
place. On the other hand the very existence of these motivators potentially enables 
individuals to satisfy their fundamental needs, be it material needs for extrinsic rewards, 
social needs to adhere to a social community or hedonic needs for personal growth and 
development. These two sides of the coin are inherently linked, as it is the possibility agents 
have to satisfy individual needs that generate the motivation to act towards collective goals. 
This implies a potentially mutually beneficial relationship between the individual and the 
organization. Admittedly this picture has utopian tones, but there may be real-world cases in 
which companies demonstrate that the described reciprocal relationship can in fact exist. 
Examples might include companies like Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia in the US, or 
Mondragon in Spain. These firms are characterized by high levels of personal commitment 
on the part of individuals to the objectives of the firm, reciprocated with priority attention 
given by managers to the satisfaction of personal growth objectives, and to social 
responsibility issues in general. 
  Next we applied the motivational lens to take a fresh look at the drivers of firm 
heterogeneity and argued that heterogeneity in the motivational preferences of the workforce 
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performance differences across firm, as performance depends on the correspondence between 
what motivators the firm provides and which motivators employees are receptive to.  
  The subsequent analysis of the determinants of firm boundaries also generated 
potentially important insights. We argued in fact that motivation theory contributes to our 
understanding of the factors that determine firm size, both in terms of the scale and of the 
scope of its activities. The driving force behind these effects is the preference of individuals 
for equality in organizational motivators on the one hand and the push for heterogeneity in 
organizational motivators coming from (a) an increased heterogeneity in motivational 
preferences of an increasingly large workforce and (b) the increased heterogeneity in 
motivational requirements of a broader range of activities on the other. This leads to 
diseconomies of scope and scale and thereby constitutes a determinant of firm boundaries. 
In the final part of our discussion we looked at the motivational mechanism at work in 
the absence of firms. Here the key point is that the same types of motivation are at play also 
in market-based exchanges between individuals in atomistic organizations. The comparison 
of the level of motivation that can be achieved within or outside the firm is difficult to make 
in general terms.  The answer will always depend on (a) the motivational preferences of the 
individual, (b) the motivational requirements of the task and (c) the motivational context of a 
given firm or of a specific market.  In fact, the governance-based, competence-based and the 
motivation-based perspectives each illustrate a distinct set of conditions under which firms 
are at an advantage. 
 
The analysis provided in this paper may, and one may hope it will, raise more 
questions than it answers. This first attempt to apply motivation theory to questions of the 
theory of the firm has exhibited a significant amount of theoretical mileage that this exercise 
can generate through the integration of existing governance-based and competence-based 
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firm.  Consequently, one may argue that whatever insights have been generated in this 
exercise, they can constitute only the proverbial tip of the iceberg and that future research 
building on (and critiquing) these arguments will be able to produce far more.  
For example, given the similarity in the underlying logic and the complementarities in 
the focus of the three perspectives, a natural question arising is whether it is not possible to 
develop a comprehensive motivation-based theory of the firm that integrates governance-
based and competence-based theories, as well as the new preference-based arguments based 
on hedonic intrinsic motivation. Potentially, our model of different motivational mechanisms 
may serve as a starting point in the process. A comprehensive motivation-based theory of the 
firm should capture the logic that underlies existing governance-based and the competence-
based theories of the firm in that it identifies specific conditions under which firms perform 
economic activities more efficiently than markets. The origin for the firm’s advantages can be 
one, or a combination of several, of the motivational mechanisms specified in our model: 
extrinsic motivation, normative intrinsic motivation and hedonic intrinsic motivation, to 
influence individual behavior.   More, much more, needs to be done to build a comprehensive 
model, though.   
The following contingencies that have been identified in the present analysis, for 
example, and will need to be tackled comprehensively and in their interaction effects by 
future scholarship: (a) the motivational requirements of the different sub-tasks necessary to 
perform the activity, (b) the motivational preferences of the individuals involved in the 
task(s), (c) the motivational characteristics of the alternative institutional arrangements 
available to perform the activity and (d) the variability in the first three contingencies over 
time. Finally, the theory should encompass and fully reconcile existing governance-based and 
competence-based arguments and make it possible to understand the relative importance of 
either perspective in different situations. Consequently, the governance-based approach, the 
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cases of this more general motivation-based theory of the firm (Table 5). 
 
 
    ---------------  Table 5 ------------- 
 
 
An  additional area for future explanations based on the motivation-based theory of 
the firm outlined above lies in more comprehensively tackling related questions concerning 
the boundaries of the firm.   Future scholars might want to pursue this line of thought by 
identifying the conditions for the optimal choices on the firm-market continuum on the basis 
of characteristics of both motivational processes and operating activities. 
Yet another line of inquiry emerging from this line of work has to do with the 
theoretical linkages between motivational processes and economic rent generation.  There are 
costs attached to the enhancement of motivation, particularly if the interventions are tailored 
at the functional, and even more at the individual, level.  What are the conditions under which 
these costs become superior to the advantages derived from higher motivation?  Even more 
interesting is the opening of the analysis to competitive interactions among firms: to what 
extent does an increasing level of attention to motivation processes translate into sustained 
advantage vis-à-vis competitors?  Gottschalg & Zollo (forthcoming) have recently started to 
tackle some of these questions, but much more needs to be done.  For example, differences 
among the various types of motivational levers with respect to their potential for sustained 
advantages have not been studied yet: given these differences, it would be important to 
understand under what conditions can the prioritization of each type of motivational lever 
produce competitive advantage.  
As these reflections upon possible avenues for future research show, this paper 
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serious consideration the influence of motivation.  Given the importance of the questions 
discussed above, and even more of those left undiscussed, we call for a joint effort from 
scholars in the different areas of management science to invest in understanding the potential 
implications that an explicit treatment of motivation might have in their respective areas of 
expertise.  It seems to us that the development of a comprehensive motivation-based theory 
of the firm that integrates and extends existing approaches can only be the result of a serious 
integration of insights from social psychology, economics, organizational behavior and 
strategy alike. We are convinced, however, that a collective endeavor of this kind to further 
develop the ideas offered above will be well rewarded.  
 









The desire to obtain 
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the behavior 
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characteristics of the 
task and the task 
context 
The importance of being 
engaged in an enjoyable, 
self-determined and 
competency-enhancing 
activity to the individual.
 
Motivation can be linked to a set of underlying goals, from whose accomplishment 
individuals derive a certain level of utility.  This then creates a motivation to engage in 
behavior that is perceived by individuals to be useful for meeting their goals.  The motivation 
to behave in a certain way is determined by: (1) the motivator, which determines the way, and 
the extent to which, the behavior contributes to the accomplishment of individual goals; and 
(2) individual motivational preferences, i.e., the relevance of different goals, which determine 
the sensitivity of the individual to different motivators.  
 
 
Table 2: Contrasting Governance-Based and Competence-Based Approaches  
  Governance-Based Approach  Competence-Based Approach 




Employment Contract   Shared Identity 
Focal Type of 
Motivation at 
Work 





Potential Opportunism  Desire to Belong 
 
A sufficiently high level of abstraction, governance-based and competence-based approaches 
to the theory of the firm both follow quite a similar logic: Each of them identifies one 
particular mechanism based on which firms facilitate the efficient performance of one 
specific set of activities. The mechanism that each perspective specifies can be attributed to 
one distinct type of motivation. This focus on one type of motivation follows directly from 
the assumption the respective school of thought makes regarding the motivational preferences 
of individual actors. 
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Effect of Increasingly  
Heterogeneous 
Motivational Preference 
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Effect of Increasingly  
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Motivational 
Requirements of the Set 






No loss of 
motivation 
Loss of motivation  
(employees with 
heterogeneous motivational 
preference cannot be 
effectively motivated through 
uniform organizational 
motivators) 
Loss of motivation 
 (tasks with heterogeneous 
motivational requirements 
cannot be effectively 











No loss of motivation  
(employees can be effectively 
motivated through tailored 
organizational motivators) 
No loss of motivation  
(tasks can be effectively 
supported through tailored 
organizational motivators) 
 
Provided that employees prefer to have uniform organizational motivators (Reward System, 
Socialization Regime and Job Design) across their firm, heterogeneity in (a) the  motivational 
preference of the workforce and/or (b) the motivational requirements of the set of tasks to be 
performed in the firm forces the firm to make a choice between two evils: either firms can 
tailor organizational motivators to meet individual preferences and motivational 
requirements, which causes unpopular heterogeneity in the organizational motivators and can 
be a de-motivator by itself, or they keep organizational motivators homogeneous, at the cost 
of sub-optimal motivation levels.  No matter which position a firm chooses between full 
homogeneity or perfect tailoring, there will always be some level of inefficiency related to 
the heterogeneity in motivational preferences and requirements. 
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Form of Motivation  Motivator in the Firm  Motivator in the Market 
Extrinsic 
Motivation 
Reward System  
(e.g. financial rewards, 
promotion rules, non-financial 
rewards) 
Market Conditions 
(e.g. the amount of profit or 





Organizational Norms and 
Values 




Job Design  
(e.g. degree of specialization, 
empowerment) 
Characteristics of market 
activity (e.g. degree of 
rivalry) 
 
Firms can actively design their organizational motivators (Reward System, Socialization 
Regime and Job Design) to enhance different types motivation. Individuals outside firms who 
participate in market-based exchange can be subject to the same three types of motivation. 
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Motivation is stimulated through three types of motivators: additional extrinsic resources, 
organizational norms and values and task characteristics. The three motivators interact in 
their effect on extrinsic, normative intrinsic and hedonic intrinsic motivation.  The joint 
impact of these motivational mechanisms on overall motivation is contingent upon individual 
motivational preferences regarding the different determinants of motivation.  
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• Job Design
Individuals




• Identification with Social Community
• Growth and Self-Actualization
 
Firms are can be seen as devices to develop and direct individuals’ motivation to act towards 
the achievement of collective goals. At the same time they offer an organizational context in 
which individuals are able to satisfy fundamental extrinsic and intrinsic needs. These two 
aspects are inherently linked. Firms potentially provide individuals with what they 
fundamentally care for and individuals in exchange contribute through their behavior to the 
accomplishment of organizational goals. 
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Antecedents of Motivation in the Firm  




















of the Activities 
 
Organizations can influence aggregate motivation through adjustments of three 
organizational motivators: Reward System, Socialization Regime and changes in the Job 
Design.  The three factors interact in their effect on extrinsic, hedonic intrinsic and normative 
intrinsic motivation. The overall level of motivational efficiency depends on the level of 
correspondence between the organizational motivators and (a) the aggregate motivational 
preferences of the workforce and (b) the motivational requirements of the activities to be 
performed.  
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